Desperately Seeking Diplomacy
Daniel Solomon is the national director of STAND, a student organization focused on genocide prevention. He blogs at Securing Rights.
February 29, 2012
In late January, the United States special envoy to Sudan, Princeton Lyman, warned of a looming famine
in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, two of Sudan’s contested border
regions. According to Lyman, the famine stems from eight months of armed conflict
between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North, a rebel group,
and the Sudanese armed forces. To make matters worse, Khartoum has
imposed restrictions on humanitarian aid throughout the border regions. The United States government estimates place the famine’s human toll at half a million people.
With memories of Khartoum’s brutal counterinsurgency campaign against Nuba rebels during the early 1990s and, more problematically, against insurgents in Darfur, human rights advocates have pressed for escalated action in Sudan’s border regions. They have called for familiar-sounding policy interventions: humanitarian corridors to facilitate needed aid delivery, and punitive no-flight zones to protect civilians from frequent air strikes. Proponents point to historical precedents: if a no-flight zone ensured civilian protection in Benghazi, and cross-border aid delivery secured famine relief during the Sudanese civil war, then both approaches are sure-fire, responsible approaches to conflict resolution in Sudan.
Unfortunately, calls for intervention underestimate the strategic
barriers to successful military action in the border regions. A
humanitarian corridor through South Sudan would require the deployment
of substantial ground forces. And Khartoum would perceive international
military action as an offensive measure. Given the Sudanese regime’s
militant opposition to aid delivery, there is no international and/or local army at-the-ready to protect South Sudan and the border areas.
Meanwhile, a no-flight zone would do little to protect civilians, given the Sudanese military’s substantial artillery arsenal. In addition to the practical barriers to successful intervention, Sudan advocates should reflect on the potential moral consequences of military action in the border regions. International military intervention would further jeopardize essential (and currently functioning, and working) aid operations in Darfur, where eight times as many civilians rely on international food assistance.
If not humanitarian intervention, then, what is to be done? As Nicholas Kristof mentioned in a recent column, the United States has mounted an impressive diplomatic campaign toward Khartoum, attempting to coax the leaders to release humanitarian aid restrictions. Indeed, U.S. diplomacy has become increasingly nuanced, seeking to raise the profile, decision-making clout and political will of internal moderates.
President Obama should leverage China’s concerns over stability in Sudan — underlined by the recent kidnapping of Chinese road workers in South Kordofan — and encourage the emerging power to play a more decisive role in conflict resolution in the border regions. Sudan’s humanitarian situation remains urgent, but forceful diplomacy, rather than irresponsible intervention, has the opportunity to change the tide.
With memories of Khartoum’s brutal counterinsurgency campaign against Nuba rebels during the early 1990s and, more problematically, against insurgents in Darfur, human rights advocates have pressed for escalated action in Sudan’s border regions. They have called for familiar-sounding policy interventions: humanitarian corridors to facilitate needed aid delivery, and punitive no-flight zones to protect civilians from frequent air strikes. Proponents point to historical precedents: if a no-flight zone ensured civilian protection in Benghazi, and cross-border aid delivery secured famine relief during the Sudanese civil war, then both approaches are sure-fire, responsible approaches to conflict resolution in Sudan.
A no-fly zone would do little to protect civilians.
Meanwhile, a no-flight zone would do little to protect civilians, given the Sudanese military’s substantial artillery arsenal. In addition to the practical barriers to successful intervention, Sudan advocates should reflect on the potential moral consequences of military action in the border regions. International military intervention would further jeopardize essential (and currently functioning, and working) aid operations in Darfur, where eight times as many civilians rely on international food assistance.
If not humanitarian intervention, then, what is to be done? As Nicholas Kristof mentioned in a recent column, the United States has mounted an impressive diplomatic campaign toward Khartoum, attempting to coax the leaders to release humanitarian aid restrictions. Indeed, U.S. diplomacy has become increasingly nuanced, seeking to raise the profile, decision-making clout and political will of internal moderates.
President Obama should leverage China’s concerns over stability in Sudan — underlined by the recent kidnapping of Chinese road workers in South Kordofan — and encourage the emerging power to play a more decisive role in conflict resolution in the border regions. Sudan’s humanitarian situation remains urgent, but forceful diplomacy, rather than irresponsible intervention, has the opportunity to change the tide.
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