Issue Brief 4
Introduction
Weapons tracing is a set of methods used to identify weapons and ammunition and track their origins. It has an established role in criminal investigations, where it is typically used not only to prove a firearm-related offence, but also to uncover the source of illicit supplies to criminals. By contrast, weapons tracing in conflict and post-conflict situations—for example, by peace support operations (PSOs)— remains a matter of theory, not practice.
To date, the only bodies that have traced conflict and post-conflict weapons (and ammunition) in any quantity are UN Groups of Experts, specifically for purposes of detecting and confirming arms embargo violations.
This paper will examine the normative frameworks and practical mechanisms that could be used, specifically by PSOs, to trace conflict weapons. It will also consider some of the reasons that have so far prevented PSOs from tracing weapons. The paper begins by reviewing the main features of the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) (UNGA, 2005a), in particular those relevant to conflict tracing. It then examines the current practice (or non-practice) of weapons tracing by UN PSOs and UN Groups of Experts. It concludes with some observations on the possibilities for more systematic tracing of conflict weapons.
ITI implementation. Its ‘Follow-up’ section merely provides—in fact requires—biennial reporting by states on their implementation of the ITI, along with biennial meetings to ‘consider’ these reports.
Introduction
Weapons tracing is a set of methods used to identify weapons and ammunition and track their origins. It has an established role in criminal investigations, where it is typically used not only to prove a firearm-related offence, but also to uncover the source of illicit supplies to criminals. By contrast, weapons tracing in conflict and post-conflict situations—for example, by peace support operations (PSOs)— remains a matter of theory, not practice.
To date, the only bodies that have traced conflict and post-conflict weapons (and ammunition) in any quantity are UN Groups of Experts, specifically for purposes of detecting and confirming arms embargo violations.
This paper will examine the normative frameworks and practical mechanisms that could be used, specifically by PSOs, to trace conflict weapons. It will also consider some of the reasons that have so far prevented PSOs from tracing weapons. The paper begins by reviewing the main features of the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) (UNGA, 2005a), in particular those relevant to conflict tracing. It then examines the current practice (or non-practice) of weapons tracing by UN PSOs and UN Groups of Experts. It concludes with some observations on the possibilities for more systematic tracing of conflict weapons.
ITI implementation. Its ‘Follow-up’ section merely provides—in fact requires—biennial reporting by states on their implementation of the ITI, along with biennial meetings to ‘consider’ these reports.
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